




This paper presents an overview of the fi-
nancial-deepening process in eleven Pacific
Basin countries during the past two decades.
For any nation, financial deepening represents
an increased amount offinancing ofproduction
and investment through specialized, organized
markets. The economic literature has ex-
panded its coverage of this subject in the last
twenty-five years,l stressing financial deepen-
ing as an important factor in determining the
course ofa nation's economic growth2 and wel-
fare. This review of Pacific Basin experience
should help us see what generalizations (if any)
can be made about the factors promoting or
retarding the financial-deepening process.
Economists traditionally examine this pro-
cess within the context of developing, rather
than developed economies. In developing
economies, financial deepening is associated
with increases in the activity of financial inter-
mediaries-such as commercial banks, savings
institutions, insurance companies and the
like-because direct placement or capital mar-
kets generally are unimportant. In developed
economies, financial intermediation is less pre-
dominant as capital markets develop. While
this paper maintains the focus on financial in-
termediation characteristic of developing na-
tions, it also examines the experience of the
developed Pacific Basin countries. We include
them in the analysis in order to highlight the
changing role offinancial intermediaries in the
development process and also to highlight
those processes that are common to both types
ofeconomies.
•Assistant Vice President and Economist, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco. Benny Yu provided research as-
sistance for this paper.
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Section I presents a simple conceptual
framework for analyzing the role of financial
markets in economic growth. Drawing on the
existing literature, it distinguishes between
various modes of finance in relation to eco-
nomic growth. In addition, it analyzes the ef-
fects on economic growth of "repressed fi-
nance"-that is, a policy of rigid nominal
interest rates in the face of general price infla-
tion. This section may be skipped by those
who are familiar with the economic principles
underlying this study.
Section II presents a comparative study of
the experiences of eleven Pacific Basin coun-
tries-Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United
States. The observation period varies from
country to country depending on data availa-
bility, but generally covers the 1960-78 period.
In this analysis, we use the degree of financial
intermediation as a proxy for overall financial
development. We present two views of finan-
cial deepening-first, a cross-section view of
the degree of financial intermediation in each
country in 1978, and second, a comparison of
the eleven countries' financial-growth pro-
cesses over the entire observation period.
Relative to per capita income, Japan, Sing-
apore, and Taiwan had the highest financial-
intermediation ratios of all eleven countries in
1978. This finding does not imply that Japan,
Singapore, and Taiwan have achieved a higher
degree of financial development than such
fully-developed countries as the United States,
but merely shows that they have given a
greater role to financial intermediaries in their
activities.
The study identifies the real deposit-interest
rate-i.e., the nominal deposit rate deflated byaconsumer-priceinflationrate-asacriticalfac-
tor in setting the pace ofeach nation's financial
growth over time. Positive real deposit rates
maintained over a number of years invariably
lead to financial deepening, and negative real
deposit rates even for a year or two tend to
result in sharp financial disintermediation
against a strongly upward trend. The finding
reinforces the view that inflation is directly and
indirectly detrimental to economic growth-
assuming a positive relationship between fi-
nancial intermediation and growth. It also sug-
gests that, where inflation cannot be brought
quickly under control, interest rates ought to
be left flexible enough to cover more than the
inflation premium, and thus allow a positive
return which would encourage saving through
financial intermediaries.
I. Financial Deepening and Economic Growth
Economic growth depends on capital for- important, or whenever the adoption of mod-
mation; capital formation requires financing. ern technology requires substantial initial in-
The functioning of a financial system to gen- vestment in human and physical capital. 4
erate savings and allocate savings among dif- This difference is also important because an
ferent types of productive activities is ob- efficiently functioning financial market signals
viously relevant to a nation's economic to each investing entity the opportunity cost of
growth. Broadly speaking, a nation can choose self-finance, thus helping to weed out invest-
among three alternative ways of channeling ment projects which promise lower returns
national savings to investment (Figure 1):3 (1) than the market cost of capital. For instance,
self-finance by entities undertaking the invest- an enterprise in a country with limited finan-
ment, (2) external finance through capital mar- cial markets often has little choice but to plow
kets (direct finance), and (3) external finance back its earnings regardless of potentialities
through financial intermediation (indirect fi- elsewhere. In contrast, an enterprise in a coun-
nance). try with well-developed financial markets has
Self-finance by entities undertaking the in- other alternatives-debt retirement, repur-
vestment may occur in either of two forms- chase of its own stock, or investment in secu-
government investment in economic infra- rities of other enterprises-and cyan choose
structure (such as roads, harbors, schools, or among the various alternatives depending on
irrigation facilities) through government-budget the risks and the relative returns of the alter-
appropriations, or capital formation by private native uses of funds. A well-developed finan-
or government enterprises through retained cial market heips insure that the funds gener-
earnings. Self-finance is widely used in both ated from within each firm are channeled to
developed and less-developed countries. How- the most efficient uses from the viewpoint of
ever, in countries with well-developed financial society. Thus, self-finance itself is not neces-
markets and institutions, both government and sarily inefficient finance-but when self-fi-
private enterprises may finance either through nance is coupled with an absence of market
their own resources or by borrowing from the discipline, the result may be arbitrary and
market, whereas in countries with under-de- wasteful allocation of capital.
veloped financial markets, investing entities The second channel, direct finance, may
must accumulate savings from within. take the form of the issuance of stocks, bonds,
This difference is important for two reasons. notes, commercial paper, or other types of de-
First, when self-finance is the only available bentures by investing entities on open, orga-
approach, a highly productive investment pro- nized capital markets under various degrees of
ject may have to be postponed or scrapped government supervision and regulation. Alter-
because of its size relative to the investing en- natively, as in many less-developed countries,
tity's internal financial resources. This limita- it may take the form of advances of seeds,
tion applies whenever economies of scale are fertilizers, food, or money by landlords or
44merchants to peasants; or direct personal loans
from friends, relatives, and the general public
to business firms; or the discounting and trad-
ing of business firms' post-dated checks among
the public outside regulated markets. The
form may vary, but the essence is the same:
Direct finance consists of the ultimate bor-
rower issuing a liability against itself, and sell-
ing it either directly to the ultimate lender or
through dealers and brokers.
Direct finance is characterized by (a) the
separation of saving and investment, and (b)
the bearing of the lending risk by the saver.
Typically, the saver is not himself a profes-
sional lender, and has neither the time nor the
expertise for the continued monitoring of the
borrower's financial soundness. With direct fi-
nance, therefore, the government and well-es-
tablished large enterprises have a distinct ad-
vantage in raising funds from the market;
others must pay a higher cost of capital to
compensate for the higher risk arising out of
lenders' lack of knowledge about borrowers'
financial capacity. In this environment, inno-
vation-generating venture capital is especially
liable to suffer because of the public's lack of
expertise in risk assessment.
Moreover, borrowers typically prefer long-
term, and lenders short-term, financing. With-
out a secondary market of considerable
"depth, breadth and resilience," borrowers
have to pay higher costs for capital in order to
overcome lenders' liquidity preferences. How-
ever, a well-developed secondary market pre-
supposes a high degree of financial sophisti-
cation, based on generally accepted accounting
standards, knowledgeable investment-advisory
services, efficient communication networks,
and reasonable regulatory authorities to en-
force the rules of the game. Generally speak-
ing, such preconditions do not exist in devel-
oping nations. Not surprisingly then, developing
nations strive mightily-but usually in vain-
to develop a domestic capital market, in their
eagerness to mobilize national savings for eco-
nomic growth. In many instances, it is a policy
of chasing the will'-0'-the-wisp.
The third channel of investment finance, fi-
nancial intermediation, is characterized by a
flow of funds through financial institutions,
which specialize in intermediating between ul-
timate savers on the one hand and ultimate
users of funds on the other. These institutions
conduct their business by issuing liabilities
against themselves, and directly or indirectly
investing the proceeds in the financial instru-
ments of ultimate fund users. In general, the
more financially sophisticated a national econ-
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Benefit and Cost of
Financial Intermediation
vices than countries that rely on indirect fi-
nance alone. Moreover, financial intermedia-
tion is not costless. Investment in human
capital in finance represents a drain on soci-
ety's scarce resources which have high alter-
native costs. Buildings, furnishings, and exten-
sive communication facilities also involve a
significant social-overhead investment. These
costs are reflected in the spread between the
deposit interest rates paid to savers and the
loan interest rates charged to borrowers. A
large spread reflects a high cost ofoperations-
or a high degree of monopoly profit-for fi-
nancial institutions.
The benefits and costs of financial interme-
diation may be shown graphically (Figure 2),
by relating the volume of national savings or
investment at various real interest rates. The
curve IDF is a demand-for-capital curve under
conditions of direct financing. It is based on
the economy's aggregate production function,
and depicts the marginal productivity ofcapital
for the economy as a whole in the absence of
financial intermediation.9 The curve IF1 stands
(checking-deposit) banks, investment (mer-
chant, development) banks, savings institu-
tions, insurance companies, mutual funds,
pension funds, finance companies, and so on.
Also, the more sophisticated the economy, the
more varied is the menu of financial instru-
ments offered by these institutions-with di-
verse maturity, liquidity, riskiness, and auxil-
iary services (such as insurance, investment
counseling, and data processing) taiiored to
the preferences of ultimate savers.
Financial intermediation enhances economic
growth through the promotion of savings and
investment. By borrowing short and lending
long, financial intermediaries cater to the li-
quidity preferences of both borrowers and sav-
ers. By specializing in the provision offinancial
services, they reduce the riskiness of each in-
dividualloan through their expertise in assess-
ing the creditworthiness of each borrower. By
pooling savings and diversifying lending, they
diminish the aggregate risk of investment for
the nation as a whole. And by realizing econ-
omies of scale in financing, they reduce the
cost of capital to ultimate borrowers and
thereby encourage capital formation. 6
Compared to self-finance, financial inter-
mediation also facilitates capital formation by
enlarging the scope of financing, thereby mak-
ing it possible for enterprises to adopt modern
technology and realize economies of scale.
Moreover, it enhances the productivity of cap-
ital, by developing investment expertise and
instilling market discipline in the allocation of
capital. Compared to direct finance, financial
intermediation promotes saving, by more
closely satisfying savers' liquidity preferences,
by reducing risks of investment, and by pack-
aging auxiliary services desired by savers. The
consequent increase in savings and enhance-
ment of productivity of capital combine to
raise the nation's rate of economic growth.7
Nonetheless, despite these advantages, in-
direct finance is not always superior to self-
finance and direct finance, regardless of the
extent of each mode of finance. On the con-
trary, countries with a full complement of fi-
nancial markets, both direct and indirect, are









But since interest-rate ceilings have been im-
posed in order to lower the cost of borrowing
to business firms, financial intermediaries
probably would not be allowed to charge the
market interest rate. Instead, they would be
limited to a loan rate which would allow just
enough margin to cover their operating costs.
The ceiling loan rate will be rL(rO rL=r2r l), at
which there will be an unsatisfied excess de-
mand for funds of EF ( AB). Instead of fi-
nancial institutions enjoying an excess profit of
roDHr2' borrowers would receive an excess
profit of rLEKrl (=rDDHr2)'
Because of the unsatisfied demand for cap-
ital, an unorganized (black) market could
arise. Since the lenders in this market would
tend to be small lenders operating under un-
favorable conditions, their costs of operation
would normally be higher than those of finan-
cial institutions operating in the organized
market. The higher cost of black-market op-
erations is shown as DG (>DE), and that mar-
ket's supply curve is shown as SBM' The inter-
section of hI and SBM determines the total
for the economy's demand for capital under
conditions of financial intermediation. It lies
above the IOF curve to reflect the higher return
to capital under financial intermediation. 10 The
curve I~! lies below the curve IF! by the real
factor costs offinancial intermediation per unit
of capital.
The curve SDF depicts the amount of savings
forthcoming at various real interest rates when
savings must be placed directly by savers with
ultimate borrowers. It includes the desired re-
tained earnings of business firms for their self-
finance of investment, as well as direct pur-
chases by savers of the securities of ultimate
fund users. The curve SF! stands for the econ-
omy's total savings when there is financial in-
termediation, which increases national savings
at given real interest rates.
The equilbrium amount of savings under
conditions of self-finance and direct placement
is shown as OA, and that under financial in-
termediation is shown as OB. At OB, the real
loan-interest rate charged by financial inter-
mediaries is rL, and the real deposit-interest
rate paid by them is rD , the difference being
the real financing cost plus the institutions'
profit.
Free competition in financial markets is
shown in Figure 2, where the deposit rate (rD )
and the loan rate (rJ are both determined by
market demand-and-supply forces. In most
Pacific Basin countries, however, interest rates
are set by the monetary authorities at levels
below market-clearing levels, in the belief that
low interest rates help stimulate investment
and hence promote economic development. In
order to insure financial institutions' profita-
bility, deposit rates are set even lower. The
situation is depicted in Figure 3, which repro-
duces the curves IF[, I~[, and SF[ from Figure
2, and adds the assumption that the authorities
set a ceiling deposit rate at rD' The amount of
savings provided to the financial system would
be OA. Given the limited amount of savings,
enterprises would be willing to pay at least a
loan rate of rl . Subtracting the cost offinancial
intermediation, financial institutions could
then earn at least a profit of rDr) per unit of
capital.
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o A C B
Savings, Investmentamount offinancing effected through both reg-
ulated and unregulated markets. Total savings
and investment will be OC, of which OA is
channeled through the organized market and
AC through the unorganized (black) market.ll
Under the conditions of "financial repres-
sion" depicted in Figure 3, the size of the fi-
nancial-intermediary sector will be smaller
than in Figure 2, the difference depending on
the vigor with which the unorganized market
is suppressed by the monetary authorities. In
the extreme case where the unorganized mar-
ket is openly tolerated by the authorities-
where the costs of the unorganized market are
not significantly higher than those of the or-
ganized market-there might be little differ-
ence between OA and 002• However, we
must consider not only the impact on the vol-
ume of savings and investment, but also the
efficiency of investment. IF! in Figure 3 is
drawn on the assumption that savings OA will
be allocated by financial institutions to the
most efficient borrowers in the market, al-
though there is no assurance that this will in-
deed be the case. Under arbitrary allocative
rules, financial institutions may distribute
funds to enterprises which are less efficient, so
long as they are able to pay the loan rate of
rL • This is depicted by the dots in Figure 3 in
the box rLEKr].13 Paradoxically, under this con-
dition, bribery of bank officials for favorable
consideration of loan applications, though a
social evil, could be an economic virtue. In
other words, bribery might supplement a price
mechanism thwarted by official repression,
and thus help ensure the allocation of capital
to the most efficient users.
The condition of "repressed finance" arises
from a real deposit rate below market-clearing
levels. The low real interest rate may be the
result of a nominal rate deliberately set low in
order to encourage investment, or a failure to
adjust the nominal rate in keeping with rising
inflation. In either case, the volume of capital
formation is limited by the volume of savings
forthcoming at the given real deposit rate. The
lower the real deposit rate, the lower would
be the degree of the economy's financial inter-
mediation. But interest-rate liberalization, by
allowing nominal interest rates to be deter-
mined by market forces, would free financial
institutions to offer positive real deposit rates
and thereby stimulate the growth of the finan-
cial-intermediation sector.
II. Financial Deepening in Pacific Basin Countries
We turn now to compare the financial-deep- than $400 in Indonesia to more than $9,700 in
ening experiences ofeleven Pacific Basin coun- the United States (1978 data). Overall, during
tries during the 1960-78 period. Although it the past two decades, this region has grown
would be preferable to use the broadest pos- faster than any other region in the world.
sible measures of financial-market develop- However, individual growth rates have varied
ment, it is difficult with existing data basesl4to from an average of about 3V2 percent per year
devise comparable measures in a cross-country in the United States and New Zealand to more
sample. Thus, this analysis focuses only on than 9 percent per year in Korea and Singa-
financial intermediation, since comparable pore. In terms of inflation, the range has also
data are available only on that basis. As our been considerable, from an annual-average
earlier discussion suggests, direct finance mar- rate of a little over 3 percent in Malaysia and
kets (despite their obvious uses) are unlikely Singapore to about 14 percent in Korea and 30
to be important in developing economies. percent in Indonesia. IS •
Our survey has been designed to see what The eleven countries also exhibit a variety
generalizations (if any) can be derived about of banking structures. Banks in Indonesia, Ko-
the factors promoting or retarding financial rea, and Taiwan are predominantly owned by
deepening in countries at different stages of the government. Malaysia, New Zealand, the
economic development. In terms of per capita Philippines, and Thailand each has a mixed
income, the eleven countries range from less banking system, with one or two large state-
48owned banks competing with a large number
of private banks. Banks in Australia, Japan,
Singapore, and the United States are all pri-
vately-owned, with the government owning
and operating only development and export-
credit institutions.
Finally, all of these countries have experi-
mented with a variety of interest-rate policies.
Most of them, including the United States,
have maintained rigid controls on bank de-
posit-interest rates for small savers. However,
New Zealand since March 1976 and Singapore
since July 1975 have lifted such interest-rate
ceilings. Some countries, because of regulated
interest rates and inflation, have exhibited neg-
ative real deposit-interest rates-but others
have shown very high positive rates. We will
later examine how these variations have af-
fected financial growth in these countries.
The degree of financial intermediation of a
nation might be measured by the proportion
of national wealth held through financial in-
termediaries. Lacking adequate data on na-
tional wealth, we may assume that national
output is proportionate to national wealth, so
that financial intermediation can be measured
instead by the ratio of the consolidated assets
of each nation's financial intermediaries to na-
tional output.
We may distinguish three types of financial
intermediaries: the monetary authorities, the
deposit-money banks, and non-bank financial
institutions (savings institutions, credit unions,
insurance companies, etc.). Banks are differ-
entiated by their ability to accept demand (i.e.,
checkable) deposits and thus to expand the
money supply by creating demand deposits
against themselves, whereas non-bank finan-
cial institutions must discharge their liabilities
by drawing on their demand deposits at banks.
In measuring the magnitude of a nation's
financial sector, what is relevant is the total
claims of financial intermediaries on non-fi-
nancial sectors: government, business, house-
holds, and the rest of the world. Claims of
financial institutions on each other thus should
be netted out. This means not only inter-bank
claims, but also the monetary authorities'
claims on banks and non-bank financial insti-
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tutions, bank reserves held at the central bank,
and cash reserves of banks and non-bank fi-
nancial institutions.
Financial Intermediation, 1978
The degree of financial intermediation is
shown by the total consolidated assets of each
country's financial sector and their distribution
between foreign and domestic assets-all ex-
pressed as ratios to national output (Table 1).
In each category, the eleven countries are
ranked according to the magnitude ofthe ratio
into four groups: (I) High, (II) Medium-High,
(III) Medium-Low, and (IV) Low, degrees of
financial intermediation.
Most (but not all) of these countries showed
about the same rankings in terms oftotal assets
(TA/Y) as in terms of domestic assets (DA/Y).
By both criteria, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan,
and the United States exhibited the highest
degree of financial intermediation in 1978.
New Zealand stood by itself in a second group;
then followed Australia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand; and lastly, Indone-
sia fell far behind the others in financial inter-
mediation.
It is tempting to seek some explanations for
these rankings. For example, one might hy-
pothesize that financial development is a "lux-
ury" good in the process of economic devel-
opmenL16 This would suggest that income
levels can explain observed differences in fi-
nancial intermediation. However, the extent of
financial intermediation is itself a determinant
of income levels through its effect on growth.
Thus, to isolate the effects of income on finan-
cial development would require a simultane-
ous-equation model describing growth pro-
cesses and their two-way relationship to
financial development-a difficult task given
the notorious difficulty of modelling growth
processes.
More importantly, however, there are haz-
ards in constructing a practical, cross-country
measure of the extent offinancial development
even if the income/financial-deepening rela-
tionship is well understood. It may surprise
some, for example, to see that Japan, Singa-
pore, and Taiwan had higher financial-inter-mediation ratios in 1978 than the United States
(Column 1 of Table 1). Generally we assume
that the United States has the world's best-
developed and most innovative financial mar-
kets, and that New Zealand and Australia are
also well advanced. In contrast, financial mar-
kets and institutions in Japan, Singapore, and
Taiwan are considered to be much less devel-
oped and shackled by official restrictions.
How can the observed financial-intermedia-
tion ratios squarewith this general impression?
Part of the answer may lie in the composition
of financial assets. In 1978, foreign assets as a
ratio to national output were several times
larger in Singapore and Taiwan than in the
United States (Column 3). This reflects the fact
that financial institutions in these highly open
economies engage in international financial in-
termediation-i.e., borrowing and lending
abroad-to a much larger relative extent than
do U.S. institutions. This is particularly true
for Singapore, where international assets ac-
counted for nearly one-half of the total assets
of financial institutions in 1978. But when we
exclude foreign assets, the degree of domestic
financial intermediation in 1978 was higher in
the United States than in either Singapore or
Taiwan.
More importantly, the financial-intermedia-
tion ratios, TAIY or DAlY, describe only the
indirect-finance portion of a nation's financial
activities. As we have seen, despite the many
advantages of indirect finance, a financial sys-
tem dominated by such a system may reflect
stunted growth in capital markets. There is a
great deal of complementarity among self-fi-
nance, direct finance, and indirect finance, so
that a well-developed financial system may
combine aspects from each of these modes of
finance. Just because one country boasts a
higher financial-intermediation ratio than an-
other does not mean that it has a more ad-
vanced financial system than the other country.
Financial Deepening, 1960-78
While international comparisons of finan-
cial-intermediation ratios might be misleading
indicators of financial development, we may
gain much useful information from an inter-
temporal study of the growth of the appropri-
ate ratios within each nation (Table 2). In
terms of growth oftotal-asset ratios, Indonesia
and Taiwan ranked at the top in the 1960-78
period, with very high annual growth rates, 9.4
and 7.0 percent respectively. These ratios re-
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Y Gross national (or domestic) product.
TA Total consolidated assets of the financial sector ( DA+FA).
DA Consolidated domestic assets of the financial sector .
FA Foreign assets of the financial sector.
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termediation at the beginning of the 1960-78
period. Next came Malaysia, Singapore, the
Philippines, Korea, Thailand, and Japan, with
financial-growth rates ranging from 2.6 percent
to 4.7 percent. Most ofthese countries, except
Japan and Singapore, started out with rela-
tively low financial-intermediation ratios. The
United States stood alone in the third rank
with a modest financial growth rate of only 0.7
percent per year. Lastly, both New Zealand
and Australia sustained net declines in finan-
cial intermediation during the 1960-78 period,
with average annual declines of 0.3 and 0.5
percent respectively.
We see then that the rate of financial deep-
ening tends to be negatively related to the
initial value of the total-asset ratio. One may
assume that, as a rule, opportunities of finan-
cial growth abound at an early stage of finan-
cial development, and then diminish as the
market becomes saturated with financial insti-
tutions. In order to isolate the effects of the
initial ratio, we can fit a downward-sloping
logarithmic curve to the financial-growth rates
and the initial total-asset ratios in Chart 1.J7
By this standard, which measures growth in
relation to each country's initial total-asset ra-
tio, Singapore and Taiwan stood out with the
most rapid financial growth, and Australia and
New Zealand with the slowest growth. In be-
tween, Japan and Malaysia had above-average
growth, while Thailand and the United States
had below-average growth. Table 2





Initial Initial Ratio Average Annual
Country Year Ratio in 1978 Growth (%)
Indonesia 1966 0.14 0.41 9.4
Taiwan 1961 0.38 1.21 7.0
Malaysia 1969 0.53 0.79 4.7
Singapore 1968 1.26 1.89 4.1
Philippines 1963 0.37 0.63 3.6
Korea 1962 0.39 0.67 3.5
Thailand 1961 0.40 0.67 3.0
Japan 1960 1.21 1.94 2.6
United States 1960 0.95 1.08 0.7
New Zealand 1960 0.86 0.82 -0.3
Australia 1960 0.70 0.65 -0.5
Source: Based on data in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
various issues.
51tween, Japan and Malaysia had above-average
growth, while Thailand and the United States
had below-average growth.
Average financial-growth rates indicate the
long-run trend of financial deepening. But it
may also be of interest to examine how finan-
cial deepening evolved over time in each coun-
try (Chart 2). Three countries-Malaysia, Sin-
gapore and Taiwan-showed nearly
uninterrupted growth in the TAIY ratio (Panel
a). Two countries-Australia and New Zea-
land-both attained a high l~el of financial
intermediation by the 1960's but sustained
sharp declines in the TNY ratio in the follow-
ing decade (Panel b). The other six countries
all achieved net financial growth, but their
growth was marked by prolonged periods (two
years or more) of zero growth or declines in
the TAIY ratio (Panels c and d).
To help explain these diverse patterns, we
should seek to determine what might account
for the broad changes in the trend of financial
growth in the various countries. For public pol-
icy, short-term fluctuations in the financial-in-
termediation ratio are hardly of interest. On
the other hand, it would be desirable to find
Chart 2
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52out if changes in financial-growth trends are
subject to any systematic influences under pol-
icy control.
This can be done by examining the move-
ment of the financial-intermediation ratio in 27
different episodes, comparing it with the cor-
responding average real-deposit rate, i.e. the
nominal deposit rate minus the consumer-price
inflation rate (Table 3). According to our theo-
retical analysis, the real deposit rate plays a
key role in determining the extent of financial
intermediation, especially under conditions of
"repressed finance." The condition describes
well the financial markets in most of the coun-
tries studied, with the nominal deposit rate
fixed inflexibly in the face of consumer price
inflation.
All the episodes with falling financial-inter-
mediation ratios were associated with negative
real deposit rates, some as large as minus 34
percent in Taiwan in 1974 and minus 19 percent
in Indonesia in 1972-74. All of these episodes
reflected attempts to maintain stable nominal
deposit rates in the face of high domestic in-
flation rates. Onthe otherhand, all theepisodes
with rising financial-intermediation ratios were
associated with positive real deposit rates-or,
if negative (Indonesia in 1974-78, Japan in
1974-78, and Korea in 1976-78), with a signif-
icant increase in the real deposit rate from the
Australia
Table 3
Relationship Between Financial Deepening and Real Deposit Rate
Period Total Assets/Output (TA/Y) Real Deposit Rate (%)
1960-64 Rising (from 0.70 to 0.76) 3.10
1964--69 Flat (from 0.76 to 0.75) 1.37

































Rising (from 0.13 to 0.28)
Falling (from 0.28 to 0.26)
Rising (from 0.26 to 0,41)
Rising (from 1.21 to 1.76)
Falling (from 1.76 to 1.64)
Rising (from 1.64 to 1.94)
Falling (from 0.39 to 0.25)
Rising (from 0.25 to 0.61)
Flat (from 0.61 to 0.62)
Rising (from 0.62 to 0.67)
Rising (from 0.53 to 0.79) except for
dip in 1974
Rising (from 0.86 to 0.90)
Falling (from 0.90 to 0.77)
Rising (from 0.77 to 0.82)
Rising (from 0.37 to 0.63) except flat
in 1973-75
Rising (from 1.26 to 1.89) except for
dip in 1974
Rising (from 0.38 to 1.21) except for
dip in 1974
Rising (from 0,40 to 0.60)
Falling (from 0.60 to 0.55)
Rising (from 0.55 to 0.67)
Rising (from 0.95 to 1.(7)
















2.83: except 8.7 in 1970-74
4.3: except ~ 16.2 in 1973-74





~2.0preceding period. The only exception was Ja-
pan during 1960-72, when a substantial rise in
the TA/Y ratio took place in spite of a small
negative real deposit rate. This case may have
reflected a very strong propensity to save
through financial institutions, coupled with a
vigorously growing national economy. How-
ever, Japan's TA/Y ratio fell sharply in 1972-
74, when the real deposit rate dropped to a
negative 11 percent.
Sustained positive real deposit rates have
meant rising financial intermediation in all
cases except one: Australia in 1964--69, when
the TA/Y ratio remained virtually unchanged
instead of rising. But Malaysia, Singapore, and
Taiwan, the only countries with nearly unin-
terrupted financial growth, were also the only
countries that consistently maintained high
real deposit rates. In all three cases, the only
decline in the financial-intermediation ratio
occurred in 1973-74, when high inflation rates
turned their real deposit rates briefly negative.
The Philippines also showed steady financial
growth, except for a two-year period (1973-
75) when the TAlY ratio remained flat, in line
with a sharp decline in the real deposit rate.
In sum, the real deposit rate appears to play
a significant role in financial deepening. A pos-
itive rate sustained over a number of years all
but assured financial growth, whereas a sus-
tained negative real deposit rate nearly always
brought about financial stagnation or decline.
There were some exceptions to this rule, but
in each case, financial growth accompanied a
significant rise in the real deposit rate, even
when the rate itself remained negative.
We do not claim that the real deposit rate
was the only factor determining the financial
growth rate. Rapid economic growth and a
high savings propensity helped offset the ef-
fects of a negative real deposit rate during
several periods of vigorous financial growth-
Indonesia during 1974--78, Japan during 1960-
72, and Korea during 1976-78. Yet despite
these exceptions, the real deposit rate consis-
tently played a key role in stimulating financial
growth in most of the episodes analyzed here.
III. Summary and Conclusions
The economic literature suggests that orga- riod. In contrast, Australia and New Zealand
nized financial markets, and financial inter- sustained net declines in their degree of finan-
mediation in particular, possess certain advan- cial intermediation. The other six nations all
tages over self-finance in terms of promoting recorded growth in financial intermediation,
savings and efficiency ofinvestment. The anal- but with varying periods of stagnation or set-
ysis in this paper focusses on financial inter- back.
mediation for reasons of data consistency, but The real deposit interest rate played a crit-
it is important to remember that direct finance ical role in setting the pace of each nation's
also plays a major development role in coun- financial growth. Positive real deposit rates
tries with fully developed financial markets. maintained over a number of years invariably
Financial intermediation ratios in 1978 were led to financial deepening, while negative real
significantly higher in Japan, Singapore, and deposit rates (even over brief periods) could
Taiwan than in Australia, New Zealand, and result in sharp financial disintermediation
the United States. The explanation lies partly against an otherwise strongly upward trend.
in Singapore and Taiwan's high degree of in- Other factors, such as a vigorously growing
ternational intermediation, and partly in Ja- economy with a high propensity to save, oc-
pan, Singapore and Taiwan's relative lack of casionally offset the adverse effects of a neg-
alternative channels of financing, compared ative real deposit rate-for instance, in Japan
with the other developed economies. during 1960-72. However, such reversals were
In terms of growth over time, Malaysia, relatively rare, and failed to contradict the hy-
Singapore, and Taiwan achieved nearly unin- pothesis that a negative real deposit rate is
terrupted financial growth during the data pe- detrimental to financial deepening.
54Because ofthe importance of financial deep-
ening for economic growth, economic policy
should be aimed at reducing inflation, which by
definition lowers the real deposit rate. Where
inflationcannot be broughtdown quickly, inter-
est rates should be allowed to adjust with suf-
ficient flexibility to permit a positive real rate of
return to savings.
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(2') S = S(F)Y
g == YIY
S = K = S(F)Y
and substituting (4) into (3) we obtain
Y= YKS(F)Y + YFF
Then, by equating savings with net investment,
Now, by definition, economic-growth rate
where YK and YFare partial derivatives of Y with respect
to K and F, and a dot over a variable indicates its rate of
change over time. Now, assume that the savings function
is homogeneous of first degree with respect to Y, such
that (2) may be rewritten as
Substitute (5) into (6) to obtain
Equation (7) states that the degree of financial interme-
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rectly enhances economic growth in proportion to the mar-
ginal productivity of financial intermediation relative to the
national product (YFIY).
Note that this analysis excludes considerations of the
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9. The benefits and costs of financial intermediation give
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cial sector. For an analysis of the problem, see U Tun Wai,
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opment, edited by Ronald I. McKinnon, 1976, pp. 11-22.
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grammaticanalysis is due to Sho-Chieh Tsiang, "Fashions
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12. This factor partially accounts for the frequent failure
to find significant effects of real interest rates in empirical
studies of national savings. See Vincente Galbis, 'Theo-
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Countries," International Monetary Fund, DM/79/7, Feb-
ruary 1979.
13. This form ofdiagrammatic presentation is due to Max-
well Fry, "Money and Capital or Financial Deepening in
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P.O. Box 7702
San Francisco, California 94120
14. The only available source of internationally compa-
rable data is the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database. The financial intermediation measure devel-
oped here is the broadest indicator of financial-market
development calculable with that data.
15. For Indonesia, the data refer to the period from 1966
to 1978.
16. Goldsmith found that the income elasticity of demand
for financial assets was greater than unity for both devel-
oped and less-developed countries. See Raymond W.
Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, Yale,
1969, Table 4-11, p. 204.
17. The regression equation is rFG 1.52 - 3.22
1n(TAIY)a, R2=0.44, where rFG is the average annual rate
of growth of the TAN ratio, and (TAIY)a is the initial ratio
of total assets to national output.
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